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In wartime, demographic groups with a greater resemblance or relation to the populations
of adversarial powers often bear the brunt of social pressure on the homefront. To a degree, even
the oft-hated proponents of peace -- who sometimes do coincide and overlap with the
aforementioned sort of demographics -- seem to receive comparably less vitriol from the rest of
the public. Indeed, wartime powers frequently persecute portions of their population for the sake
of uncovering a “fifth column” -- an idea made popular by a fascist general in the Spanish Civil
War who claimed that the march of his four columns on the capital had been aided by another
column formed by citizens within the city.1 During the Second World War, the United States
government, believing that its western coast was at risk to similar sabotage, interned its own
citizens of Japanese descent, many of whose families had existed peacefully in the country for
decades by that point. Such perceptions of a demographic’s subversive potential are often
fabricated entirely, as they were during World War I when various powers incorrectly viewed
their Jewish citizens as being agents of their opponent nations. Similarly, the Ottoman Empire
predicated its atrocities against Armenians on such paranoia, ultimately resulting in genocide. All
of these instances fly in the face of the fact that any given demographic -- whether it be ethnic,
racial, or cultural in nature -- holds in itself a great many attitudes, motivations, and objectives.
In essence, no demographic is monolithic in the sense that it may be prone to a single approach
in its wartime attitudes and activities.
During the First World War, Americans of German descent certainly did not stray from
this principle, especially as they engaged in endeavors that ranged from actively supporting the
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Germanic-dominated Central Powers, to serving against them on the Western Front, to
disparaging their fellow German-American citizens in acts of “superpatriotism.”2 Nevertheless,
the American establishment on the homefront frequently viewed the entirety of this demographic
as being particularly susceptible to acting out as fifth columnists, who were expected to rise
against the United States and aid in the German and Austro-Hungarian military efforts. To
reduce the perceived probability of this, as well as to ensure the comfort of Americans outside of
the Germanic demographic, various departments of the government clamped down on the
vestiges of German-American cultural expression that united them, especially churches and
schools, which supposedly fostered or signaled disloyalty to the nation. In Missouri, the governor
at the time, Frederick Gardner, assigned a state council of defense with this special task, as he
himself had been instructed to do per the guidelines of the National Council of Defense.3 In turn,
the Missouri Council of Defense engaged in rhetoric that was deliberately authoritarian and
further incited American society to conduct grassroots campaigns against the civil liberties of
any nonconformists, especially German-Americans.
Traditionally, scholarship on the German-American experience in World War I holds that
the campaigns of anti-German proponents were deliberately harsh and fueled primarily by
popular paranoia, which resulted in negative cultural effects for German-Americans across the
homefront. In his article, “The War against German-Americans: The Removal of German
Language Instruction from Indianapolis Schools, 1917-1919,” Paul Ramsey claims that antiGerman proponents acted so vehemently against the demographic that the effort could be
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considered as a sort of “crusade.”4 Similarly, G.J. Meyer, author of The World Remade: America
in World War I, posits that a sort of “war fever” came over almost all sectors of society in its
endeavor to rid the United States of German-American traditions in which linguistic ties
apparently signaled disloyalty.5 Consequently, much of the existing scholarship on the topic
focuses on which portions of the German-American population seem to have been impacted the
most. Indeed, the pre-eminent study of German-American experience in the Great War, Bonds of
Loyalty by Fredrick Luebke, indicates that “the most harmless and apolitical groups [of GermanAmericans]… were the ones who suffered the most severe persecutions.”6 With such a dynamic
in play, scholars tend to agree that Anglo-American society, manifested in agencies like the
councils of defense, did not distinguish the individual elements of the German-American
demographic, opting instead to paint the population in a purely black-and-white dichotomy of
patriotism and treachery.
Furthermore, significant portions of the existing scholarship on the topic examine the
degree to which Germanic heritage played a motivating role in the actions and rhetoric against
German-Americans. In other words, much of the discourse focuses on the degree to, as well as
the reasons for, which othering took place as a cultural phenomenon. Kamphoefner simplifies the
matter by stating that the Anglo-American mainstream tended to mistake “cultural loyalties or
mere language preservation with political loyalty to the Fatherland,” and as such, he focuses
much of his study on the reality of a wide chasm that separated German-Americans and
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Germany itself in the decades prior to the Great War.7 In large part, DeWitt -- in her book
Degrees of Allegiance: Harassment and Loyalty in Missouri’s German-American Community in
World War I -- contradicts the view of cultural othering by claiming that social, political, and
economic conflicts primarily on the local level motivated German-Americans’ domestic
opponents, which included other German-Americans.8 In fact, she asserts that this motivation
ought to cause reclassification of the German-American experience as being “harassment, not
persecution.”9 To a degree, Katja Wustenbecker reinforces the sort of claim made in Dewitt’s
work, as she highlights the fact that Americans who were clearly of German descent also
participated in the scapegoating of other German-Americans -- even in violent instances.10
While the existing scholarship focuses largely on these physical realities as well as the
motivating factors behind them, a relatively lesser amount of focus seems to have been devoted
specifically to authoritarian-leaning strategies. At the same time, though, the issue is not
necessarily unrecognized in the general discourse surrounding the United States in World War I.
With prominent legislation limiting civil liberties at the national level in 1917 and 1918, a great
many demographics became subjected to “an atmosphere of heightened anxiety” in which the
federal government aimed “to silence dissent among the general population,” especially in
publications that tended toward criticism of the war effort.11 Frequently, attention on these
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legislative acts and their effects is geared toward discussions of the suppression of feminist
advocates, Marxist ideologues, and other such groups that lacked conformity with traditional
American society. Even in civil histories of World War I, the federal government is noted as
having “militarized” citizenship for the benefit of the war effort, which essentially incentivized a
dogmatic sense of “honorable service” in exchange for social and political acceptance.12 While
this issue is sometimes addressed in regards to German-Americans, it is rarely done so outside of
works specifically addressing the struggle of that particular demographic. In one such work,
Wustenbecker emphasizes the degree to which the German-American experience corroborates
this trend, as “any form of dissent was… considered pro-German and thus unpatriotic” by the
councils of defense.13
However, rather than looking at the actions of the Missouri Council of Defense in
relation to the German-American experience in the First World War, this paper deliberately
examines the actions of the Missouri Council of Defense in relation to the dynamics shared
between wartime dissent, authoritarian rhetoric, and civil liberties. On the surface, these
dynamics can be thought of much in the same way that the concepts of policy, strategy, and
tactics generally are. While the anti-Germanic sentiment can be viewed as a part of a larger
wartime policy, so too can the grassroots nature of linguistic erasure be viewed as a sort of onthe-ground tactic that would help bring about the policy’s overall objective of Germanic defeat.
In turn, authoritarian rhetoric can be viewed as the strategic bridge meant to make these two
operational levels work together cohesively. Essentially, in conducting a transatlantic war effort,
the United States sought not only to combat Imperial Germany, but also to quell those cultural
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tendencies that perhaps indicated some manner of dissent and potential interference in the war
effort and domestic political stability. While German-Americans did not exist as the only
targeted category as a consequence of this strategy -- especially as political deviants like
Marxists were active -- their experience with agencies like the Missouri Council of Defense
serves as one of the best case studies of authoritarian rhetoric in American military history.
This perspective leads to some basic agreements and key disagreements with major
scholars in the field -- mainly DeWitt, who notes that in many cases, no legal or immediate
physical action was taken by the Missouri Council of Defense and its proponents. Instead, she
notes that they sometimes opted for the “friendly coercion” of German-Americans.14 At the same
time, however, such a tactic could be defined as the subtle application of duress while
declarations of non-duress are made. Even if no physical or social action was taken on a large
scale, the implication of its possible use was inherently present -- regardless of disclaimers made
by Anglo-Americans and their organizations. For this sort of action -- persuasion by the means of
implied might -- is the definition of coercion. In the case of World War I, even if many GermanAmericans willingly and enthusiastically complied with denials of their heritage and its
language, many others did so under immense social pressure.
In the decades prior to the war, no such dynamic had even been hinted at, as Americans
of German descent were frequently viewed as a valuable segment of the overall population. Even
in spite of their significant distinction as a cultural demographic, German-Americans “had been
spared much of the discrimination, abuse, rejection, and collective mistrust experienced by so
many racial and ethnic groups in the history of the United States.”15 Indeed, German-Americans
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had been allowed to flourish and culturally proliferate throughout the history of the United
States, especially in the “German triangle” formed by Cincinnati, Milwaukee, and St. Louis
during the 19th century.16 Within the smaller region outlined by these Midwestern cities, many
German-Americans exerted a large degree of influence in both economic and cultural affairs -- a
trend represented exceedingly well by the rather high number of newspapers and other
periodicals published using the German language.17 In Indianapolis alone, multiple newspapers
published in German held a readership of over 10,000, which in turn signaled the strength of
German educational and social institutions throughout the Midwest.18
The distinction of such German-American institutions in the pre-war years is typified by
small rural settlements like Hermann, Missouri, which was noted in early 20th century accounts
as being linguistically diverse, especially in the schools and churches.19 Even as nearly all in this
community spoke German, not all necessarily spoke the same Germanic dialect, including those
like Hanoverian or Westphalian, and not all German speakers could even understand each others’
choice of dialect, meaning that on some occasions they had to “compromise on a neutral ground,
poor English.”20 Indeed, while they maintained strength and pride in these linguistic and cultural
traditions, German-Americans set themselves aside from the Fatherland in many ways. Notably,
German-Americans began to adopt the predominant language of the United States -- English -which, by the second generation of most German-American family lines, had supplanted German
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as the preferred language of the individual.21 This was especially the case as most transatlantic
exchanges of correspondence between European Germans and German-Americans lasted a mere
six years, thus signaling a certain dissipation of social and political ties between the two
groups.22 In turn, by the eve of the Great War, German-Americans had established a fairly
prominent sense of “nostalgic love” for their Fatherland, but ultimately, that was all it amounted
to -- for publicized political loyalty to Imperial Germany remained a rarity for those integrating
into American society.23
This, however, did not indicate that German-Americans felt a complete lack of sympathy
toward Germany in the early years of the war, nor did it prevent the Anglo-American mainstream
from leveling tense accusations of these sympathies being dangerous and unreasonable. In
private correspondence, German-Americans often reflected on the new fate of their old country,
with some remarking that they believed the war had been “forced upon Germany and not brought
about by the Kaiser.”24 Such sentiments further represent some German-Americans’ sincere
doubts regarding the reliability of stories, especially those covering developments on the
Western Front. At times, German-Americans’ reservations about the news, such as those stories
regarding German war crimes in Belgium, stemmed from the idea that they had been composed
from or colored by British propaganda.25 In essence, without European sources of information
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that they viewed as trustworthy, some German-Americans lambasted England early in the war
for putting Germany in a stranglehold with its naval blockade and and publicly prayed for the
Kaiser’s ultimate victory in 1914 and 1915 -- a time when such an end to the war would have
meant relatively little to the neutral United States, at least in the official short-term capacity.
Additionally, German-Americans frequently addressed the war in increasingly formal
methods that emphasized the American component of their identity and engaged in various
activities befitting of the democratic processes of governance. More specifically, they expressed
concerns over the United States’ position as a neutral nation through their correspondence with
political representatives, and they responded to American policies that affected the war with both
assent and dissent.26 The matter of international trade policy served as a particular flashpoint for
many German-Americans, especially as they criticized arms sales and financing that contributed
to the English war effort and the naval blockade of Germany in particular, which had the
potential to hamper the economic and physical well-being of German civilians and soldiers
alike.27
Indeed, throughout the entirety of World War I, the attitudes of German-Americans did
not fit any single preconceived perspective. Instead, they followed the principle of demographic
variation as it relates to immigrants and the generations that follow them. Carl Schurz, the U.S.
Secretary of the Interior during the Civil War and a German immigrant himself, had previously
articulated the sort of choice faced by German-Americans in World War I: one between
estranging either the country comparable to their mother, Germany, or the country comparable to
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their wife, the United States.28 As a result, German-Americans often, though certainly not
always, sided with the United States’ neutrality early in the war while also engaging in discourse
sympathetic to Germany.29
Nevertheless, such expression still caused discomfort for their Anglo-American
neighbors in a way that would be remembered quite well after the sinking of the Lusitania, the
Zimmerman Telegram, and the American entrance into the Great War.30 In April 1917, when the
United States issued its official declaration of war against Imperial Germany, the tide of
goodwill -- having already begun to shift with news from the Western Front -- officially and
almost entirely turned against German-Americans, whom many Anglo-Americans now viewed
as potential fifth columnists. In fact, by that point, anti-German mania had rooted itself so deep
into the Anglo-American mainstream that it drove many citizens to the point of pure paranoia. In
letters written in both 1916 and 1917, a St. Louis entrepreneur expressed the concept that many
German-Americans directly contributed to the German war effort by way of subversive
networking.
As if German-Americans were in direct correspondence with the German Army’s High
Command, the entrepreneur claimed in February of 1917 that “they are posted in advance of
every move Germany makes.”31 While certainly outlandish, the base claim that Germans kept in
contact with German-Americans does hold true to a degree, as relatives from the motherland
sometimes did continue past the aforementioned average of a six-year exchange and keep sparse
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correspondence with those who had emigrated prior to the war years.32 Furthermore, the
subversive bend of this claim also matches a wildly more radical notion in a letter the
entrepreneur wrote in August of the previous year: “Our Teutonic citizens (???)... are preparing
to elect as many men to office as possible who are PRO-GERMAN, so that when the collapse of
the Central Powers comes all the power of these office holders [sic] can be used to force this
country to step in and save Germany from punishment.”33 Even as the United States remained
neutral at the time of these writings, citizens such as this entrepreneur held many fears that
German influence -- in any form -- would soil the integrity of both the United States and the
Entente war effort it had joined.
On June 15th, 1917 -- just over two months after the United States’ entry into the war -the federal government enacted legislation that set the groundwork for much of the authoritarian
rhetoric that would villainize German-Americans in an official capacity and lead to the violation
of their civil rights. Much of this action served as a disproportionate response to mysterious
accidents, later discovered to be foreign hostilities, that had already briefly touched the
continental United States, especially several acts of sabotage by German agents throughout
1916.34 In particular, the destruction of a munitions facility on Black Tom Island in New York
Harbor during July 1916 motivated much of the country to a popular sense anti-German panic -as well as to legislative processes intended to better secure the nation from additional attacks and
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the prospect of a fifth column.35 Just under a year later, Congress passed the Espionage Act,
which “called for a fine of up to $10,000 and imprisonment for a period up to 20 years for
anyone found guilty of having ‘willfully obstructed’ the United States’ war effort or supported
those of its enemies in speech or in print.”36 Furthermore, the Trading with the Enemy Act,
passed by Congress just a few months later in October 1917, formalized the distrust of those
speaking or publishing in a foreign language, essentially requiring that all foreign-language
publications be monitored by the government for any sort of news regarding the war.37 As a
result, those expressing dissent in any fashion found themselves in a precarious position in which
simple sympathies for a cause could serve as grounds for legal ramifications.
Even prior to this point, however, government officials began preparing the nation for
“the hardships that must be endured” in the anticipated times of war.38 Indeed, public figures like
the Governor of Missouri in 1917, Frederick Gardner, issued rhetoric that served as deliberate
justification for censoring dissent on the homefront, which he proposed as being one of the
aforementioned hardships that would be necessary in conducting an efficient war effort. In fact,
Gardner stated in a speech during February 1917 that “our Government at peace and our
Government engaged in international warfare are two entirely different institutions” -- a claim he
reinforced with the idea that all civil functions were to be subordinated to the country’s wartime
objectives.39 To this end, he also stated that “those in authority must and should wholly disregard
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laws and customs that are wise and just in times of peace” so that the war effort could be won in
the shortest amount of time possible.40
Furthermore, in a way, this served as an expansion of the war to a new theater -- one in
which the “outward looking and deterritorializing” nature of the American war machine was
reversed so that political opponents might be neutralized as well, albeit temporarily in most
cases.41 Essentially, Gardner’s rhetoric indicated that the state deserved to be unopposed in its
prosecution of the war effort. This was especially the case as Gardner requested that citizens “not
be moved to captious criticism because of personal inconvenience” caused by special wartime
policies on the homefront, such as the aforementioned Espionage and Trading with the Enemy
acts that would be passed just a few months after this speech. In this way, Gardner and other
officials essentially asked their constituents to censor their genuine concerns about wartime
policies for the sake of perceived political stability, and when groups like German-Americans did
not immediately comply, the government began engaging in “wholesale repression.”42 In fact, so
overwhelming was this disregard for free speech that the U.S. Attorney General during the war,
Thomas W. Gregory, remarked that “it is safe to say that never in its history has this country
been so thoroughly policed.”43
When paired with the Espionage Act and the Trading with the Enemy Act, such rhetoric
weaponized the dynamics of political assent and dissent, as can be seen in the social and political
policing done by the Missouri Council of Defense. Formed specifically in accordance with
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guidelines from President Woodrow Wilson’s administration, this new state institution
immediately began working toward higher military recruitment rates as well as increased
safeguards against additional instances of sabotage, among other objectives.44 In doing so, the
Missouri Council of Defense also fostered councils of defense that were to be run at the
municipal and county levels, thus bringing in an aspect of grassroots involvement that would
further fuel the anti-German fears afflicting the nation. Indeed, documentation of the Missouri
Council of Defense’s communications paints a picture of an organization with loose
administrative structures that allowed for a large degree of independent action at the local levels
of operation. In some instances, this organizational flexibility and mass involvement led to
missteps toward the objectives of the councils, such as one in which the authorities of Jefferson
City, Missouri, passed an ordinance prohibiting the speaking of German in public. While such
actions occurred throughout the state with significant support from the public and the councils
that organized them, many of them -- including the one in Jefferson City -- also met resistance
from legal authorities due to poor planning as well as the fact that they originated on the fearful
whims of a manic populace.45
In any case, such actions were common and encouraged by the Missouri Council of
Defense and its subsidiary councils. This is hardly surprising, considering that government
officials, defense councils, and the citizens supporting them often held a widespread belief in
German-Americans as saboteurs and German language instruction as “Prussianized’ education,”
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which would supposedly militarize the youth and leave them in favor of Germany.46 In fact, this
perception surrounding German-Americans proved itself so prevalent that, in April 1918, the
Department of Education actually issued guidelines featuring the prohibition of German
language instruction in both public and private schools.47 Such guidance likely stemmed in large
part from the nativist sentiment common to the United States in the 19th century as well as in
European societies throughout the 20th century.48 As a result, one can also see the currents of
nationalism -- a contributing factor key to the rise of some authoritarian regimes -- coursing
through the rhetoric of the councils of defense, especially as there was a significant emphasis on
efforts bringing about a cultural environment in which “every one residing in the United States
uses nothing but the American language.”49 Even in the work of translating German-language
newspapers, the councils of defense ensured that the work was “done by American women who
are in each case thoroughly conversant.”50
In turn, such rhetorical emphases also indicate a level of cultural othering so common to
European states with authoritarian policies, such as Imperial Russia with its treatment of
languages in its own communities of ethnic minorities.51 Although the case of German-
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Americans proved itself much less severe than this example and other outpourings of
authoritarian rhetoric, it nevertheless followed the practice of scapegoating frequently found in
such politically-volatile states. In the very same memorandum from the Department of Education
-- and amongst four other points of advice regarding German language instruction -- a restriction
on textbooks was recommended: “Books used in the schools should not contain material
antagonistic to the principles of the Government of the United States or principles or sentiments
out of harmony with our democratic ideals.”52 With the inclusion of this guideline alongside
those regarding German instruction, the Department of Education -- and therefore the Missouri
Council of Defense -- equated German-speaking Americans with unpatriotic traitors.
Accordingly, such policies allowed Missouri and the nation as a whole a social diversion much
more convenient to the war effort than the building movements of feminism and Marxism, the
latter of which had interrupted the Russia’s effort against Germany and perhaps intimidated the
Americans conducting their own.
Again, this sort of paranoia served fears of German-Americans that were quite real in the
mind of the Anglo-American mainstream, which in turn were typified in the efforts of the
Missouri Council of Defense as it worked to disrupt the traditions that created commonalities
amongst German-Americans as a cultural demographic. More specifically, the Council often
sought an all-or-nothing approach where German-Americans were concerned, and its Secretary
Chairman, William F. Saunders, spread throughout the local councils an attitude in which “no
man can be neutral… between the interests of America and the Imperial Government of
Germany'' -- even if that man found these two countries to be equally his own.53 This, in turn,
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meant that city and county councils of defense, as well as the Missouri Council of Defense itself,
only needed to reach a low threshold -- indeed, a mere denial of compliance or any criticism
from German-Americans -- for domestic sanctions to be further ordered and carried out upon
them. It is this sort of absolutist, authoritarian rhetoric that connected and pervaded both the
policies and actions of the Missouri Council of Defense, which in turn steamrolled much of the
constructive criticism and cultural sympathies posited by German-Americans throughout the
course of the war.
Ironically, in nearly achieving this objective, the councils of defense also engaged in
conduct similar to the ones it criticized German culture for; principally, this included the
bypassing of democratic processes for the sake of military efficiency, which the stereotypical
Prussian, and therefore German, was oftentimes associated with. Even on an individual level, the
irony of the situation presents itself in the aforementioned efforts by the councils of defense to
utilize German translators in keeping tabs on the activities and attitudes of German-Americans.54
As a whole, the councils of defense found their rhetoric and means in a contradictory position
that had been adopted simply for the reassurance of those who feared a small minority that
largely aided the war effort in an enthusiastic manner. Even on a policy level, this essentially
limited not only German-American cultural expression, but also any nuanced political expression
by them. This is further evidenced by the numerous efforts to ban the speaking of the German
language in the public, such as on streets and in schools, but also in the privacy of churches.55
However, perhaps the most notable aspect of the Missouri Council of Defense’s
rhetorical strategy that proved itself authoritarian was its use of “friendly coercion,” as DeWitt
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termed it.56 This method of anti-German action oftentimes bordered on being more within the
realm of on-the-ground tactics and simple relations with German-Americans, though they subtly
exuded some manner of authoritarian rhetoric. In correspondence to Saunders from a GermanAmerican pastor in St. Louis, the latter is noted as having promised and subsequently provided
the former with a “list of all officers, Pastors, Professors, and Teachers of the Missouri Synod of
the Lutheran Church.”57 Consequently, this allowed the Missouri Council of Defense “to
ascertain whether a pastor or teacher, who may happen to be under a cloud, [was] a member of
[the] synod or not.”58 Again, the German language was equated here -- in this case by an actual
German-American -- with a higher potential for disloyalty, thus further contributing to an
othering of a cultural group that was noted by many other writers in Council documents to have
been quite the opposite.
Indeed, German-Americans are occasionally noted in the Missouri Council of Defense’s
correspondence -- mostly by council officials on the local levels -- as being “absolutely loyal in
every way and upon all occasions.”59 Yet with the rarity of such statements in official
communications, as well as with popular instances of harassment and violence against Germanspeakers in public, German-Americans doubtlessly felt the immense pressure and intimidation
that lie latent in the social and political environment of the American homefront in World War I.
Indeed, by whipping and shaming a man who had spoken German publicly in St. Thomas,
Missouri, the grassroots proponents of the anti-German movement provided German-Americans
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with a fearful example of the possible outcomes if cultural deviancy and political dissent
persisted any further into the war.60
Similarly, the lynching of a German-American man for his “disrespectful remarks”
regarding President Wilson further served as a cautionary tale to other German-Americans.61 As
a result, as well as due to the legal ramifications of the Espionage Act, the repercussions of being
“under a cloud” of dissent or sympathy for Germans posed immense dangers to expressive
German-Americans, and thus also rendered some strategies by the Missouri Council of Defense
pointless.62 In particular, with seemingly-ironic efforts to keep the anti-German movement
within legal boundaries, Saunders recommended that the Boone County Township Council of
Defense “not threaten, simply advise” in its friendly coercion.63 As a whole, with both subtle and
more emboldened warnings to German-Americans, such instructions proved themselves both
contradictory and meaningless, especially since violations in spite of them required repercussions
on behalf of the Espionage Act and brought out the public’s anger.
In return for all of this anti-German policy and authoritarian rhetoric, the Missouri
Council of Defense and its popular proponents received almost exactly what it had requested
since its inception in 1917 -- the erasure of the German language in Missouri. With some
officials from the Missouri Council of Defense also fostering an attitude that “those who cannot
understand any English whatsoever… are a negligible quantity,” the government and its popular
proponents neglected and even abused a sector of its own population. Accordingly, the actions of
the Missouri Council of Defense naturally took on an unjust quality befitting of authoritarian
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movements, since grassroots-level efforts at ensuring security oftentimes merely reassured some
concerned citizens while depriving others of their rights -- namely their First Amendment rights.
Indeed, the federal and state governments in the later years of World War I loosely curtailed
liberty for the sake of efficiency and a false sense of security in the domestic scene. Even the
Governor of Missouri in 1917 indicated that this ought to have been the official policy adopted
by all citizens during the course of the war, as he stated in a February of that year that, in times
of war, “those in authority must and should wholly disregard laws and customs that are wise and
just in times of peace.”64
As a result, the German-American experience in Missouri during the Great War
frequently entailed surrendering one’s long-held linguistic tradition -- in nearly every setting and
context -- to the government. Although the Missouri Council of Defense did act in this way with
the direct sanction of the state and federal governments, it still engaged in activities that
essentially proved authoritarian and unfair, regardless of whether or not it was intended as such.
In attempting to “win this war with the minimum amount of friction,” the state of Missouri and
its Council of Defense ultimately created additional social and political tension that conveniently
served the self-interests of the United States government and forced German-Americans to
choose between their heritage and unnecessary compliance with “a nation of orders.”65
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